Growth Continued in Q4

First Trust Monday Morning Outlook

Brian S. Wesbury - Chief Economist

Robert Stein, CFA - Dep. Chief Economist

January 27, 2025

We still believe the odds of a recession are higher than most investors think. Monetary policy tightening started back in 2022 and inflation remains above the Federal Reserve’s 2.0% target, which means the Fed will be reluctant to get loose anytime soon.

Meanwhile, the federal budget deficits in the past two years have averaged about 6.5% of GDP, which is enormous considering the US was not at war and the unemployment rate averaged about 4.0% during the same timeframe. We think those deficits have temporarily masked or hidden some of the pain the economy will eventually feel from the tightening of monetary policy compared to a few years ago. Now, in the short run, reducing government spending, like on “green energy” and Medicaid may temporarily reduce economic growth.

However, in the meantime, the economy continued to grow in the fourth quarter. Innovators and entrepreneurs in high-tech industries and elsewhere have been overcoming government obstacles to push the economy forward. And if the new Administration in Washington moves swiftly to deregulate, there is a chance this will continue.

For the fourth quarter itself, we estimate that Real GDP expanded at a 2.8% annual rate, mostly accounted for by growth in consumer spending. (This 2.8% estimate is not yet set in stone; reports on Tuesday about durable goods and Wednesday about international trade and inventories might lead to an adjustment.)

Consumption: Auto sales soared at a 26.4% annual rate in Q4, the fastest pace for the year, while “real” (inflation-adjusted) retail sales excluding autos climbed at a tepid 1.2% rate. Real service spending appears up a moderate 2.3% pace, bringing our estimate of real consumer spending on goods and services, combined, to a 3.1% rate, adding 2.1 points to the real GDP growth rate (3.1 times the consumption share of GDP, which is 68%, equals 2.1).

Business Investment: We estimate a 2.9% growth rate for business investment, with gains in intellectual property leading the way and business investment in equipment as well as commercial construction both up slightly. A 2.9% growth rate would add 0.4 points to real GDP growth. (2.9 times the 14% business investment share of GDP equals 0.4).

Home Building: Residential construction rose at a moderate pace in the fourth quarter, buffeted between a lack of housing supply (which should boost growth) and higher mortgage rates (which should dampen construction). Home building looks like it grew at a 2.5% rate, which would add 0.1 points to real GDP growth. (2.5 times the 4% residential construction share of GDP equals 0.1).

Government: Only direct government purchases of goods and services (not transfer payments) count when calculating GDP. We estimate these purchases were up at a 2.3% rate in Q4, which would add 0.4 points to the GDP growth rate (2.3 times the 17% government purchase share of GDP equals 0.4).

Trade: The trade deficit looks like it was stable in the fourth quarter, with neither imports nor exports changing much on net versus the third quarter, in spite of monthly volatility due to the threat of, and actual, port strikes. We’re projecting net exports will have zero net influence on Q4 real GDP growth.

Inventories: Inventory accumulation looks like it was slightly slower in Q4 than Q3, translating into what we estimate will be a 0.2 point subtraction from the growth rate of real GDP.

Add it all up, and we get a 2.8% annual real GDP growth rate for the fourth quarter. As we’ve been saying, not a recession yet, but that doesn’t mean that the US economy is out of the woods.

The attached information was developed by First Trust, an independent third party. The opinions are of the listed authors at First Trust Advisors L.P, and are independent from and not necessarily those of RJFS or Raymond James.  All investments are subject to risk. There is no guarantee that these statements, opinions, or forecasts provided in the attached article will prove to be correct. Individual investor's results will vary. Past performance does not guarantee future results. Forward looking data is subject to change at any time and there is no assurance that projections will be realized. Any information provided is for informational purposes only and does not constitute a recommendation. Investing involves risk and you may incur a profit or loss regardless of strategy selected.

This Economist Survived a Wildfire. Now She's Taking on California's Insurance Crisis

NPR Newsletter

By Greg Rosalsky

January 23, 2025

Three decades ago, Nancy Wallace narrowly escaped death in what was then California's most destructive wildfire. Since then, the problem of wildfires has gotten much worse, so bad in fact that the state now faces a crisis in its market for home insurance. Solving the insurance crisis is something that's very much in Wallace's wheelhouse, and she's been developing some important ideas and tools to try to fix it.

Wallace is a professor of finance and real estate at UC Berkeley's Haas School of Business, and she's a former adviser to the U.S. Treasury Department and Federal Reserve. She specializes in identifying and mitigating financial risks in housing markets, and she's conducted some eye-opening studies on the rising risk of wildfires. She's working with climate scientists to create forecast models that can help rescue failing insurance markets. And she's advocating for new insurance schemes and financial products that would help California homeowners retrofit their homes and lower the danger that they're destroyed by future fires.

But Wallace's expertise in this area is more than just academic. It's informed by her horrifying experience.

A Story That Begins With Fire

On Oct. 20, 1991, Wallace smelled smoke wafting in the air outside of her home, high in the hills above Oakland, Calif. The day before, a fire had broken out down her street. Firefighters had put it out, but she was now on high alert. The air felt dry. The wind was picking up. And the smell of smoke scared her.

Wallace grew up in Michigan, never experiencing the danger of wildfires. She and her husband had moved to Oakland a few years earlier when she got a job at nearby UC Berkeley. They scraped together every penny they could and bought a fixer-upper in the Oakland Hills, near the ridgeline of the mountains above the city, surrounded by Monterey pine and eucalyptus trees. They had finished remodeling their home just one month before this fateful day.

After smelling smoke, Wallace and her husband grabbed family heirlooms and antiques, important documents, some paintings and clothes, and their cat. They jumped in their car. And that's when they saw a hurricane of fire engulfing the neighborhood below them.

They turned frantic. When they hit a fork in the road, they hesitated whether to turn right or left. Both directions were being enveloped by flames. Wallace insisted they go right.

" Seconds after going right, a car came out of the flames," Wallace says. "And they said, "If you go up this road, you will die." They said that power lines had fallen on a truck. A firefighter (who turned out to be Oakland Fire Battalion Chief James M. Riley Jr.) and a passenger he was trying to rescue were both dead, and the truck and power lines were blocking the road. Wallace and her husband were forced to turn around.

"At that point our cat shed her fur — literally shed her fur," Wallace says. "Because the fire was just beating on our car. I thought for sure the car would burst into flames."

They drove the other direction, down a winding, one-lane road through the heart of the inferno. Embers were flying everywhere. Houses and trees were bursting into flames. They saw a motorcyclist on fire. They saw frantic drivers crashing into trees. They saw a heroic policeman — officer John William Grubensky, who would soon die attempting to rescue a family from a burning home — on a loudspeaker, trying to keep people calm and get them out safely.

Wallace and her husband got lucky. Their 6-year-old son was miles away, safe and sound during the whole ordeal. He had spent the night at a friend's house. They were also lucky, of course, to escape with their lives. On the very same narrow street they had escaped on, vehicles after them got stuck behind a car that crashed, blocking their exit route. "Just on that one street, I think there were five people who died, along with officer Grubensky," Wallace says.

About two weeks later, Nancy and her family returned to see what happened to their home. It had turned to ash. "In the middle of this ash was a porcelain bowl," Nancy says. Porcelain apparently doesn't burn. "It was just sitting on top of the ash by itself. It was surreal. Everything else was gone."

The Oakland Hills fire in 1991 ended up killing 25 people, injuring 150 others, and destroying around 3,000 homes. For a long time, it was the most destructive fire in California history. That is, until the last decade, when California has seen a mind-boggling uptick in even more destructive fires, including two in LA in recent weeks.

 Why California Properties Got More Valuable After Fires

Around five years ago, Wallace recounted her incredible story in the Oakland Hills fire to her former PhD student Carles Vergara-Alert, who was back in Berkeley on a sabbatical as a visiting professor, and two other Berkeley economists, Richard Stanton and Paulo Issler. And it inspired them to study how the rising risk of wildfires was affecting housing markets.

A pretty weird thing seemed to be happening to properties destroyed by fires. Nancy noticed it in her own community. After the fire, people got insurance money and rebuilt their homes. Their homes seemed to get bigger and nicer. And, like elsewhere in the Bay Area, their home values went on a rocket ship to the moon in the decades after the fire. It was like everyone had forgotten that it was still a risky area.

Of course, this was just a casual observation about one place. Wallace, Vergara-Alert, Issler, and Stanton decided they wanted to build a comprehensive dataset to see what happened, more systematically, to California housing markets after they were scorched by wildfires.

The dataset they assembled is pretty amazing. After each fire in California, the state's fire agency, Cal Fire, sends a team of technicians to investigate. They create detailed maps of the burn areas and document, house by house, damages. The economists used this rich data on burn areas between 2001 and 2015, focusing on the houses that burned and the nearby houses that did not. They combined this data with their own comprehensive data on virtually every home in California.

You might think that property prices of the houses that burned would plummet. I mean, the house is destroyed, nearby parks, trees, hiking trails, and everything else is scorched, and the home's views become burn zones, at least in the near-to-medium term, before nature and man-made structures come back from the ashes. Even more, you might think that the risks of living in the area would be top of mind for years to come, suppressing demand to live there. But no. Houses continue to be valuable investments in these fire-prone communities. Not only that. The economists find that, between 2001 and 2015, the properties that burned down and got rebuilt were actually significantly more valuable within five years of the catastrophe. Fire actually boosted their property values!

One sort of obvious reason for this is these rebuilt houses were newer. And they were built to follow a more modern, state-mandated building code, making them more resistant to fire and earthquakes and generally safer. And, just as Wallace had observed in her own neighborhood, these rebuilt houses tended to be bigger.

And, in big wildfires, the houses in whole neighborhoods got built back bigger and better. Because the value of your house is influenced by the value of houses in your neighborhood, that was another boost to property values. Meanwhile, nature recovers — and, Wallace says, it recovers rather quickly in areas with Mediterranean climates — and the amazing beauty of these Californian communities returns.

Now, fires are obviously devastating in terms of lives lost, people hurt, disruptions to business, and so on. And for people who don't have insurance, they cause huge financial losses. But — at least in the period the economists study, when, for the most part, there were functioning private insurance markets that offered full coverage and generous payouts — it seems like fires were actually a financial win for the average insured homeowner who lost their home. They were also a win for developers and construction companies, which rebuilt the homes. And they were at least partially a win for municipalities because rebuilt, more valuable homes meant higher property taxes, offsetting the tremendous taxpayer costs of fighting the fire and cleaning up afterwards.

Of course, there was at least one huge financial loser in all of this: insurance companies. They had to foot the massive bill for home reconstructions.

In normal insurance markets, that's fine. People pay premiums, and those premiums are estimated based on the probability of losses. When those losses materialize, the insurance company pays. It's the whole game.

But, Wallace says, something funky began happening in California's insurance markets, and the state's insurance system ended up breaking down.

How California's Insurance Market Failed

First, the state has had restrictive regulations on what insurance companies can charge. Wallace says that a big force behind that was Proposition 103, which was championed by Ralph Nader. Back in the 1980s, Nader and other consumer activists argued that insurance companies should be strictly regulated when setting their premium rates. This ballot initiative, which was narrowly approved by California voters in 1988, required insurance companies to get rate hikes approved by the California Department of Insurance, and it introduced a bunch of measures that made rate hikes much harder to impose.

In this post-Prop 103 regulatory scheme, for example, the state prevented insurance companies from using forward-looking estimates of risk — so-called "catastrophe models" — when setting their rates. Consumer advocates saw these kinds of models, which use computers to forecast an uncertain future, as a Trojan horse for price-gouging. The state forced insurers to only use backward-looking estimates of risk. They figured it was more transparent and fairer to use hard, verifiable data from the past. The state required insurers to base their premium rates on a 20-year average of historical losses. It also prevented insurers from pricing into their premiums the cost of "reinsurance," or insurance for insurers — something that insurers sometimes need after extreme weather events require massive payouts.

With these and other measures, the California Department of Insurance effectively kept home insurance premiums artificially low. And, Nancy says, that had some big side effects, like incentivizing more people to live in fire-prone areas.

"Prices are important, especially for things like where people locate, where houses are built," Wallace says. Artificially low insurance prices, for example, may have encouraged cities and developers to build neighborhoods closer to the flammable wilderness. In fact, in recent decades, fire-prone areas have seen some of the fastest population growth rates in the state.

And greater density in fire country may have contributed, Wallace says, to problems like narrow roads prone to traffic jams, making escapes from wildfires — like the one she personally made — much harder. And this increased number of people living in fire-prone areas meant that taxpayers had to invest much more in firefighting and other public services to keep people safe.

For a time, California's insurance system was maybe workable. Big, destructive fires used to be rarer, so the insurance system didn't experience as much stress. But, Wallace says, around a decade ago, there was a tipping point where big wildfires started becoming more frequent and more destructive. California has seen hotter temperatures. Droughts have increased. Wind speeds have picked up. And big, destructive fires have become more commonplace.

With climate change, it has started to become clear that the future will not look like the past, and California's regulations requiring insurers to make pricing decisions based on backward-looking models of risk have started to look pretty dumb.

In a free market for insurance, a higher risk for catastrophe would result in higher insurance premiums. But since California regulations prevented that, insurance premiums stayed artificially low. As big fires began demanding big payouts and the specter of more mass destruction loomed larger, insurance companies struggled to make the math work. And so they began fleeing the state.

"The California Department of Insurance is seriously at fault," Wallace says. "They destroyed the markets."

With no ability to get standard private insurance, many Californians, especially in high-risk areas, were forced onto the state-created insurance plan of last resort, the California FAIR Plan (which is funded by private insurance companies and their policyholders in exchange for these insurers being able to sell property insurance in the state). This plan was not meant to be a permanent solution. It's a high-risk pool. It's expensive and it caps insurance payouts, so people with valuable properties, for example, can't get the full value of their homes insured. (For more on the Fair Plan, listen to The Indicator's recent podcast episode, "Who's on the hook for California's uninsurable homes?")

Last year, seeing insurers fleeing their state — and perhaps seeing the studies by Wallace and others — California regulators came to the conclusion that the state's insurance regulations were unworkable. California's insurance commissionersupported by Governor Gavin Newsom, ended the ban on using forward-looking catastrophe models for setting premiums, giving the green light to the insurance industry to start actually trying to price in the rising risk and cost of wildfires. As part of this deal, insurers have agreed to underwrite more policies in fire-prone areas. Those changes took effect mere weeks ago, just before the outbreak of fires around Los Angeles.

Governor Newsom recently touted the fact that, after these changes took effect, a private insurer agreed to insure homes in the town of Paradise, which notoriously burned entirely to the ground in 2018 (listen to this 2021 Planet Money episode about efforts to rebuild the town).

" I thought that was an absolutely crucial step," Wallace says of California's recent reforms to how it regulates insurance markets. "Now we have to get to work and figure out what the true pricing should be."

What Is The Right Price For Living In Fire Country?

Finding the right price for insurance premiums entails building and refining statistical models that can nail down the risks of wildfires for houses and businesses around the state. The current models, Wallace says, are not good enough. Insurance companies and the government, she says, "literally do not know" what the real risks are. There is quite a bit of uncertainty about, for example, how far fires can spread, which exact homes are the most at risk, and whether big fires in certain places are like 50- or 20- or 10-year events. Inaccurate estimates of fire risks, Wallace says, could result in premiums that are too low, as has been the case for a while in much of California, but also too high in some cases.

And that's why she and her colleagues at UC Berkeley, and, more specifically, Wallace's lab at the Fisher Center for Real Estate and Urban Economics, have been building bridges across disciplines, marshaling the data and intellect of climate scientists, computer scientists, engineers, economists, and more to create high-tech models that can better estimate the risk of wildfires.

And that's important. As we've seen, the costs of fire destruction are enormous. And someone has to pay for it. If homeowners want to continue living in fire-prone areas, Wallace says, they need to bear more of the risk and, in effect, pay higher insurance premiums.

"This risk cannot be borne exclusively by insurance companies," Wallace says. "It's also got to be borne by homeowners." Bearing more of that risk would, she says, incentivize homeowners to take more actions to protect their properties (and fight what economists call "moral hazard," or people's tendency to not take steps to mitigate risk when they're insured).

Beyond just accurately pricing wildfire risks, Wallace says, the government and insurance companies should work to incentivize and help homeowners to retrofit older, more flammable homes. Wallace points to a study by economists Patrick Baylis and Judson Boomhower. The economists find that California houses built after the mid-1990s — and, even more, those built after 2008 — are far more likely to survive wildfires. That's because the state strengthened its building codes during those years, requiring that homes be built with, for example, more fire-retardant siding and roofs.

" In Paradise, in Sonoma, in Napa, the Woolsey fire, the houses that survive are those with the post-2008 building code requirements," Wallace says. "The major problem in California is that our [older] housing stock is not built to withstand the embers and the radiant heat of fires."

But updating California's older housing stock is super expensive. Which is why Wallace wants policymakers and businesspeople to create new home loan programs, which would make it feasible for California homeowners to invest in making their homes more resistant to fire. She believes this could even be a money-making product for financial firms. " If you're a bank, wouldn't you like to invest in home loans that make the mortgages that you're also planning to make safer?"

Wallace also hopes that, going forward, insurers could offer discounts on home insurance for taking anti-fire measures that lower risks, further incentivizing homeowners to protect their homes and reduce costs. This could be facilitated by technological innovations. For example, Wallace points to a former grad student of hers who actually created an app, Firebreak, which helps homeowners identify fire risks around their properties.

What Happens After The Fires In The LA Hills?

As Wallace and her colleagues found in their study, for a long time, California homes that were destroyed by fires ended up getting bigger, better, and more valuable. Will the same thing happen again in the LA hills after the latest shocking fires?

Wallace suggests that it's possible this time is different. For one, "We don't have that insurance market anymore," Wallace says. "It's been broken by not allowing firms to price the risk."

Many homes in the LA hills were forced off of private insurance policies that gave them full coverage, and they had to turn to the California FAIR Plan, which caps residential coverage at $3 million. There are a significant number of destroyed homes in the LA hills that were worth more than that. Wallace also points to less affluent neighborhoods, like Altadena, where many homeowners did not have insurance (only people with mortgages are required to have fire casualty insurance). Absent some sort of government help, many fire victims will likely be unable to afford reconstruction. In the wake of natural disasters, construction costs tend to surge because tons of people need to build all at once and there are shortages of everything.

Another big cost will be building back better. If the city and state are being sensible, Wallace says, they will make investments in better infrastructure, like a less fire-prone electricity grid and better water systems to fight fires, making it less likely for future fires to break out and spread. Even more, she says, the state should continue mandating that builders of new houses follow the building code that's proven to be more resilient to fires. " It's absolutely nonsensical to build back in the same risky way," Wallace says. (Gov. Gavin Newsom recently issued a vague executive order on this issue, directing state agencies to waive building regulations to speed up construction, but only those regulations "that can safely be suspended.")

Because of high costs and more limited insurance coverage and other factors, Wallace says, there may be fewer homes built in the LA neighborhoods devastated by fires. And, with higher insurance premiums reflecting the risk for buildings there, these neighborhoods will likely become even more exclusive dens for the rich.

Despite the current tragic circumstances, however, these burned-down neighborhoods still have a lot going for them. Their views of the ocean and the city are often incredible. Their charred parks and hiking trails will recover. And they're still close to a legendary metropolis, with a vibrant culture, an incredible economy, and a housing shortage. The land in the LA hills is still very valuable.

"LA is a major, metropolitan, gateway city of the world," Wallace says. "And it is not going away."

And whether it's floods, tornados, earthquakes, or wildfires, human beings have a remarkable knack for comfortably living in areas with lots of risk.

Wallace expects that, if the state pursues the right path to make these neighborhoods more resilient to future fires and follows through with fixing the state's broken insurance system, destroyed properties in the LA hills will be rebuilt, insurable in the private market, and they'll eventually "return to trajectory," increasing in value like they were in the years preceding the devastation.

As for the victims who lost everything in the fires, Wallace, reflecting on her own experience losing her home, advises people to begin creating inventories of the things they lost and working with builders to get real estimates of the costs to rebuild, keeping in mind that construction costs will likely climb as everyone else seeks to rebuild. Such information can be critical for getting adequate payouts. Insurers may provide a vital service, she suggests, but they're not really your friends.

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The attached information was developed by NPR an independent third party. The opinions are of the listed author at NPR and are independent from and not necessarily those of RJFS or Raymond James.  All investments are subject to risk. There is no guarantee that these statements, opinions, or forecasts provided in the attached article will prove to be correct. Individual investor's results will vary. Past performance does not guarantee future results. Forward looking data is subject to change at any time and there is no assurance that projections will be realized. Any information provided is for informational purposes only and does not constitute a recommendation. Investing involves risk and you may incur a profit or loss regardless of strategy selected.

The 60/40 Model and The Elephant in the Room

First Trust Monday Morning Outlook

Brian S. Wesbury - Chief Economist

Robert Stein, CFA - Dep. Chief Economist

January 21, 2025

As economists and financial market forecasters, we are constantly amazed at how so many people analyze, forecast, research, and discuss important topics without ever addressing the elephant(s) in the room.

While this is not the highlight of today’s missive, economic research and academic model building is a perfect example of what we are talking about. Economists (especially academics) spend a lot of time working on “General Equilibrium Theory,” attempting to build models of the macro-economy where supply and demand are in balance.

While these models are sold as brilliant, they actually do a terrible job. For example, many economists have argued that the US entered a “Great Stagnation” in 1973, when productivity and wage growth slowed.

The question is: Why? And explanations vary. Some say things like “you can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics” – the argument being that there are winners and losers from technology, but little net gain. Many forecast a coming boom from technology, but real GDP has averaged just 2% growth per year in the past 20 years…about half of its growth rate from 1950-1973.

Others blame inequality, the lack of education, and less powerful unions. Some of these analyses, of equilibrium and economic growth, dip into inefficiencies of the tax system, or certain subsidies, like for agriculture, or the mortgage interest deduction. But none of them deal with the elephant.

The elephant in the room is the sheer size and growth of the federal government. Especially redistribution. In 1965, the year Lyndon Johnson pushed through the Great Society programs, non-defense government spending was 9.5% of GDP. By 1973, it had climbed to 12.5%. It was 15.2% in 2007, 17.5% in 2016 and today it is 20.4%. This growth is astounding.

Think of it this way…if we invent a new technology that grows our output by 10% through greater efficiency, that is basically equal to what the government is taking (20.4% - 9.5%) each year to redistribute as they see fit. Taxation and redistribution rob the benefits of innovation. Yes, of course technology has made us more productive, so why isn’t growth stronger? The answer: excess government spending.

None of the General Equilibrium Models that we have seen incorporate the size and growth of government in their equations. That’s why they will always be wrong…and debating slow growth will be useless. If we want the Great Stagnation to end we must cut the size of government. Cutting the size of government in half is the most direct path to 4% per year real GDP growth.

This brings us to the 60/40 investment model. For a very long time (maybe centuries) investors have known that diversification lowers risks. At one point a formula for stocks versus bonds was to take 110 minus your age and put that percent into stocks. The older you are the fewer stocks. Some simplified this approach and used a 60% stock and 40% bond portfolio.

But, in the past decade, this approach has hit the wall. After performing well – limiting volatility, while providing solid returns – it fell apart. If you search the web for 60/40 investing, you will find story after story about how this strategy just doesn’t work anymore. The question is: Did it stop working because it is fundamentally flawed or did it stop because it was a fad …like stocks doing well in a year an NFC team won the Super Bowl, or “sell in May and go away”?

There is a reason…and that reason is that the Federal Reserve has destroyed it. In 2008, with the advent of Quantitative Easing, the Fed was given the power to pay banks interest on excess reserves (IOER).

What these policies did was separate the money supply and bank reserves from interest rates. It used to be that banks traded federal funds every day. But now banks all have excess reserves…trillions of dollars…and there is no longer a market in federal funds. In other words, the federal funds rate is set at the whim of the Fed. To put it simply, it is price fixing.

Since 2008, the Federal Funds Rate has been set by the people who vote at Federal Reserve meetings. For nine of the past sixteen years the Fed held the rate at near 0%, and for nearly 80% of the time since 2008 federal funds paid less than inflation.

Interest rates are supposed to compensate investors for inflation plus a real rate of return on top of that. So, if interest rates are held below inflation, bond yields (fixed income returns) don’t do their job. No wonder the 60/40 model didn’t work.

What’s wrong with the 60/40 model is that the Fed broke it because it wanted to help fund massive government spending at artificially low interest rates. There is no real monetary policy justification for this. Sure, the Fed will say the old system was fragile. But their system is top-down management. Big government is the problem. The Elephants in the room were all built by government. Fixing that would give the economy a chance, and return sanity to the markets.

The attached information was developed by First Trust, an independent third party. The opinions are of the listed authors at First Trust Advisors L.P, and are independent from and not necessarily those of RJFS or Raymond James.  All investments are subject to risk. There is no guarantee that these statements, opinions, or forecasts provided in the attached article will prove to be correct. Individual investor's results will vary. Past performance does not guarantee future results. Forward looking data is subject to change at any time and there is no assurance that projections will be realized. Any information provided is for informational purposes only and does not constitute a recommendation. Investing involves risk and you may incur a profit or loss regardless of strategy selected.

The Housing Outlook: 2025

First Trust Monday Morning Outlook

Brian S. Wesbury - Chief Economist

Robert Stein, CFA - Dep. Chief Economist

January 13, 2025

If you’re going to remember one important fact about the housing market, it’s that with the brief exception of COVID, the US has consistently built too few homes almost every year since the housing bust got rough in 2007.

For the first few years during the housing bust the underbuilding of new homes made perfect sense. We built way too many homes during the housing boom, generating a massive amount of “malinvestment” in response to perverse government incentives that included having Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac buying enormous amounts of subprime debt.

But the underbuilding continued long past the point when the excess inventory was gone. Back in November, the most recent reported month, builders started homes at a 1.289 million annual rate, well below the 1.5 million plus rate that we believe is needed to keep pace with population growth and scrappage (due to both voluntary knockdowns as well as disasters like fires, floods, hurricanes, and tornados.)

As a result of the shortage of homes, we expect housing prices to continue higher in 2025 in spite of some general broader economic headwinds. The national Case-Shiller index for home prices was up at a 3.7% annual rate in the first ten months of 2024 (through October) and we expect a similar pace of increases again in 2025.

In terms of construction, housing was a mixed bag in 2024. Single-family housing starts were probably up about 6% last year versus 2023 (we will get December figures on Friday morning), but multi-family starts plummeted about 25- 30% to the slowest pace in about a decade. However, it’s hard to see multi-family starts continuing to drop in 2025 – they’re already so low! We expect a slight rebound in multi-family and continued gradual increase in single-family starts.

In turn, some more construction should help boost new home sales modestly, as well. New home sales were up 2% in 2024 versus 2023 and we foresee a similar modest gain in 2025.

Existing home sales, however, run on different dynamics and should just tread water versus the roughly 4.05 million annual rate of 2024. Builders of new homes can shift to lower-priced models with fewer features in the face of higher mortgage rates or economic weakness. But existing homes are already built and often have to be priced high enough to entice homeowners who borrowed money at rock-bottom mortgage rates in 2020-21 to sell.

To summarize, housing is far from a bubble. And there are so many other factors affecting housing that we think the sector would even weather a recession. Put it all together and we have a recipe for modest improvement in housing even as the rest of the US economy slows down.

The attached information was developed by First Trust, an independent third party. The opinions are of the listed authors at First Trust Advisors L.P, and are independent from and not necessarily those of RJFS or Raymond James.  All investments are subject to risk. There is no guarantee that these statements, opinions, or forecasts provided in the attached article will prove to be correct. Individual investor's results will vary. Past performance does not guarantee future results. Forward looking data is subject to change at any time and there is no assurance that projections will be realized. Any information provided is for informational purposes only and does not constitute a recommendation. Investing involves risk and you may incur a profit or loss regardless of strategy selected.

The S&P 500 Index in 2024: A Market Driven Once Again by the Mag 7

First Trust Three on Thursday

Brian S. Wesbury - Chief Economist

January 8, 2025

This week’s edition of “Three on Thursday” looks at the S&P 500 Index in 2024. Widely regarded as a barometer for the overall stock market, the S&P 500 Index tracks the performance of 500 of the largest companies listed on U.S. stock exchanges. The S&P 500 Index adopts a market-cap weighting approach, allocating a higher percentage of the Index to companies with larger market capitalizations. For 2024, the S&P 500 Index delivered a total return of 25.0% coming on the back of a 26.3% gain in 2023. Serving as a benchmark for the broader stock market, many investors found themselves disappointed as their portfolios did not experience comparable growth last year, falling short of the 25% Index return. To unravel the reason behind this disparity, along with other valuation metrics, we present three informative charts below.

The reason for the gap between the return on S&P 500 Index and the return in many investors’ portfolios lies in the dominance of the so-called “Magnificent 7” (“Mag 7”) companies — Apple (AAPL), NVIDIA (NVDA), Microsoft (MSFT), Amazon (AMZN), Tesla (TSLA), Alphabet (GOOGL), and Meta Platforms (META). These seven giants, which boasted a combined 30.6% weighting in the S&P 500 Index over 2024, contributed to most of the returns in the market last year. The S&P 500 Index had a total return of 25.0% in 2024, with the Mag 7 accounting for 53.7% of the return. This concentration of performance highlights the unique market dynamics of recent years and underscores the challenges of comparing diversified portfolios to such a narrow group of dominant companies.

In 2023, only 27% of stocks outperformed the S&P 500 Index, making it the narrowest market since at least 1995. The trend continued in 2024, with just 28% of stocks beating the index—marking the second narrowest year in nearly three decades. Such extreme concentration hasn’t been seen since 1998 and 1999. However, after that period in the late ‘90s, the market broadened out significantly over the following years.

Over the past five years, the influence of the Mag 7 on the S&P 500 Index has grown dramatically. Their combined weighting surged from 21.9% in 2020 to over 30% in 2024—the highest concentration ever recorded. The S&P 500 Index weights stocks based on their market capitalization (stock price × total outstanding shares) relative to the total market cap of all index components. The performance of these companies has been remarkable. For example, NVIDIA’s weighting jumped from 0.9% in 2020 to 5.7% in 2024. Among the group, Amazon was the only company to see a slight decline in its weighting, dipping from 4.2% in 2020 to 3.7% in 2024.

Past performance is no guarantee of future results. The S&P 500 Index is an unmanaged index of 500 companies used to measure large-cap U.S. stock market performance. Index data is for illustrative purposes only and not indicative of any actual investment. Indices are unmanaged and investors cannot invest directly in an index. Index returns do not reflect any fees, expenses, or sales charges. These returns were the result of certain market factors and events which may not be repeated in the future. References to specific securities should not be construed as a recommendation to buy or sell and should not be assumed profitable. This report was prepared by First Trust Advisors L.P., and reflects the current opinion of the authors. It is based upon sources and data believed to be accurate and reliable. Opinions and forward looking statements expressed are subject to change without notice. This information does not constitute a solicitation or an offer to buy or sell any security.

2025: A Year of Promise and Paybacks

First Trust Monday Morning Outlook

Brian S. Wesbury - Chief Economist

Robert Stein, CFA - Dep. Chief Economist

January 6, 2025

The College Football playoffs included 12 teams this year and all five automatic berth teams (because they won their conference championships) are now out, including the top two ranked teams, Oregon and Georgia. It wasn’t supposed to turn out this way, and the debate about why has only just started.

And if you think forecasting college football is hard, try the economy, stock market, and elections. Not one Wall Street firm came close to predicting the level of the S&P 500 on 12/31/24. They were all too low. The sharp slowdown in growth, or even recession, that we forecast did not come true.

Inflation stopped improving too, and even the Fed had to shift its forecast for rate cuts for 2025, reducing them from a total of one percentage point to half of that. And don’t forget that most presidential election forecasts missed the shift in nearly all demographic groups even in blue states toward Donald Trump.

All of this makes forecasting 2025 another significant challenge. The US has run nearly $2 trillion budget deficits in each of the past two years, half of all job growth in the past two years has been in government and healthcare jobs, growth in the money supply is trending higher.

At the same time, the new Trump Administration wants to cut spending by up to $2 trillion (over how many years we have no idea), push for an extension of the 2017 tax cuts, and possibly cut other tax rates as well. In addition, tariffs are in the picture, as is a significant slowdown in immigration, with deportations of some immigrants who are already here.

This follows some of the most dramatic policies in US history. We’ve always thought that COVID lockdowns were a huge negative for growth, then and in the future. Yes, we know GDP fell sharply early on, but then massive government spending (and handouts) along with the largest surge in the US money supply in the history of the country pushed GDP back up to its previous level (even with many states locked down). The stimulus masked the pain, like morphine.

We have always believed the morphine just delayed the pain and a recession was inevitable once it wore off. But the US is hooked on morphine, with irresponsibly high deficits creating government jobs and short-term spending stimulus. If Trump and DOGE cut the deficit, the morphine will wear off. With significantly less stimulus a recession is highly likely. Not a deep recession, but one that causes real GDP to decline 0.5% to 1%, and corporate profits to disappoint for the first time in years.

There are caveats to this forecast. The debt ceiling is now back in place…this means the Treasury will finally dip into its checking account at the Fed. This account holds over $750 billion, and when the Treasury spends that money, it will boost M2 growth. So, while the federal government spends less, the M2 measure of money will rise no matter what the Fed does.

This is one reason why we don’t expect inflation to fall much more. We expect CPI will be up in the 2.5 – 3.0% range this year. And what this means is that the 10-year Treasury yield, which may find a bid as growth slows, will have a hard time falling below 4%.

And when we put that into our Capitalized Profits Model, it says that stocks are overvalued by about 20% right now. Will stocks fall that much? Probably not because the market seems euphoric over the impact of AI, new satellite networks, and even Ozempic. But another year of 20%+ gains in stocks does not seem to be in the cards. We expect the S&P 500 to end 2025 between 5000- 5400…let’s say 5200.

At the same time…China is in trouble economically, while also making trouble geo-politically. One thing we believe is that if the US gets its fiscal house in order, and at the same time projects power and not appeasement, the world will become a safer place. In the Middle East, the October 7th massacre, which was absolutely horrific, was a turning point for Iran. While peace might not break out, there is less chance of a wider war. Trumps victory is also affecting politics in many other countries, just look at Canada, France, Germany and the UK.

So, while there are many positive things happening, this new world order is still uncertain. Less regulation is great for growth, but reduced deficits are a short-term headwind. In the long run, just like under Reagan, smaller, less intrusive government policies are a massive positive. But, remember, the PE ratio of the S&P 500 was 8.0 in 1981. Today, it is 28.2. In other words, unless Trump policies lift productivity, growth, and profits immediately, while reducing inflation, the stock market does not have nearly the same upside that it did in the early 1980s.

We still believe the US must pay a price for the bad policies of the past five years. And we think 2025 is the year it pays.

The attached information was developed by First Trust, an independent third party. The opinions are of the listed authors at First Trust Advisors L.P, and are independent from and not necessarily those of RJFS or Raymond James.  All investments are subject to risk. There is no guarantee that these statements, opinions, or forecasts provided in the attached article will prove to be correct. Individual investor's results will vary. Past performance does not guarantee future results. Forward looking data is subject to change at any time and there is no assurance that projections will be realized. Any information provided is for informational purposes only and does not constitute a recommendation. Investing involves risk and you may incur a profit or loss regardless of strategy selected.

S&P 500 Records Its Second Straight Year of 20%-Plus Gains

Raymond James

Markets & Investing

January 02, 2025

December's market activity highlights the need for caution in the near term.

December added a question mark to the end of an otherwise strong year of growth for the equity markets. As inflation numbers continued to stagnate above its 2% year-over-year target, the Federal Reserve (Fed) – despite cutting current interest rates by another 25 basis points – expressed diminished confidence in inflation reaching its 2% target. Back in September, investors expected four rate cuts to arrive in 2025. Now the expectation is two. This news caused a chilling effect in the markets, resulting in a flat month for the S&P 500 and a 5.3% loss for the Dow Jones. Only three of 11 equity sectors were positive for the month.

Continuing a now-familiar trend, mega-cap tech stocks stood strong while volatility ruled elsewhere in the market. Small-cap stocks were hit the hardest, with the Russell 2000 dropping 7.8%, reflecting their perceived vulnerability to higher interest rates relative to their larger peers.

“We’ve been highlighting the need for caution in the near term as investors are over-optimistic and the market is priced for perfection, leaving it vulnerable to any disappointment,” said Raymond James Chief Investment Officer Larry Adam. “Longer term, we remain constructive on equities as solid economic growth should keep earnings on an upward trajectory.”

Before we dive into the details, let’s see how we ended 2024, the second year in a row when the S&P 500 saw gains of more than 20%.

*Performance reflects index values as of market close on December 31, 2024. Bloomberg Aggregate Bond and MSCI EAFE reflect Dec. 30, 2024, closing values.

Mixed signals on jobs

The U.S. economy added 227,000 jobs in November, a strong recovery following a weak – but revised upward – October report. The household employment survey, however, provided a different picture, showing a large decline in employment by 335,000 workers. This pushed the unemployment rate from 4.1% in October to 4.2% in November. Headline retail sales numbers remained strong in November – aided by car sales and online sales – but those strong spots hid weakness across other retail sectors. December’s report will be important to shed more light on the relative strength of consumer spending.

Bond yields soar as rate cuts become less certain

The Fed’s surprising tone on inflation and messaging about future rate cuts caused the 10-year Treasury yield to sharply jump from 4.17% at the end of November to 4.57% at the end of December. Despite continued historically low relative spreads, corporate and municipal bond yields have pushed higher along with Treasury yields. Income-producing investment portfolios benefit from the increased yield environment providing a continued opportunity to lock into higher income streams for longer. The upward-sloping curve present in both the corporate and municipal curves means that investors are rewarded for taking on longer spans of interest rate risk.

Incoming administration faces debt ceiling

Congress passed critical legislation preventing a government shutdown while allocating $110 billion to disaster aid and funding the $895 billion National Defense Authorization Act, which seeks to bolster telecom and cybersecurity defenses as well as establish the Department of Defense’s approach to China. With a new administration incoming and the current debt ceiling expiring on January 1, there are a few potential pathways forward – a clean increase, an increase coupled with energy reform or an increase with concessions like budget cuts from the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), a proposed presidential advisory commission whose actions are likely to be supported by the narrowly GOP-controlled house.

Agriculture crisis causes cocoa price spike

Throughout 2024, natural gas prices rose by more than 40% in both the U.S. and Europe, driven by a mix of rising demand and tight supply. Meanwhile, gold and silver also saw prices climb around 30%. But all of these commodities pale in comparison to cocoa, which is starting 2025 with prices 150% higher than at New Year 2024. This comes as a result of worsening drought conditions across West Africa, combined with a virus affecting cocoa plants specifically. In addition to making sweets costs more, the cocoa crisis is putting the squeeze on chocolate manufacturers’ margins.

Threats of U.S. tariffs and domestic political turnover cool European markets

In Europe, political turnover continued to drive uncertainty, this time as France’s President Emmanual Macron installed his nation’s fourth prime minister in a year. Meanwhile in Germany, Finance Minister Christian Lindner has been fired and domestic manufacturing suffers. Volkswagen, for the first time in the company’s history, is threatening to close manufacturing facilities. The eurozone also waits with uncertainty the incoming U.S. administration and its threats of import tariffs and the risk of a protracted trade war.

The bottom line

For the second year in a row, equity markets demonstrated powerful though uneven growth and the U.S. economy remained resilient, despite some dents in the armor. The corporate earnings outlook remains healthy, and while still above target levels, inflation has declined – even if in fits and starts. There are clearly perceivable risks – inflation, consumer spending, investor confidence, international trade – but at the end of 2024, the outlook for 2025 is positive.


Investing involves risk, and investors may incur a profit or a loss. All expressions of opinion reflect the judgment of the Raymond James Chief Investment Officer and are subject to change. There is no assurance the trends mentioned will continue or that the forecasts discussed will be realized. Past performance may not be indicative of future results. Economic and market conditions are subject to change. Diversification does not guarantee a profit nor protect against loss. The Dow Jones Industrial Average is an unmanaged index of 30 widely held stocks. The NASDAQ Composite Index is an unmanaged index of all common stocks listed on the NASDAQ National Stock Market. The S&P 500 is an unmanaged index of 500 widely held stocks. The MSCI EAFE (Europe, Australasia and Far East) index is an unmanaged index that is generally considered representative of the international stock market. The Russell 2000 is an unmanaged index of small-cap securities. The Bloomberg Barclays US Aggregate Bond Index is a broad-based flagship benchmark that measures the investment grade, U.S. dollar-denominated, fixed-rate taxable bond market. An investment cannot be made in these indexes. The performance mentioned does not include fees and charges, which would reduce an investor’s returns. Companies engaged in business related to a specific sector are subject to fierce competition and their products and services may be subject to rapid obsolescence. There are additional risks associated with investing in an individual sector, including limited diversification. A credit rating of a security is not a recommendation to buy, sell or hold the security and may be subject to review, revision, suspension, reduction or withdrawal at any time by the assigning Rating Agency.  Bond prices and yields are subject to change based upon market conditions and availability. If bonds are sold prior to maturity, you may receive more or less than your initial investment. Income from municipal bonds is not subject to federal income taxation; however, it may be subject to state and local taxes and, for certain investors, to the alternative minimum tax. Income from taxable municipal bonds is subject to federal income taxation, and it may be subject to state and local taxes. Investing in commodities is generally considered speculative because of the significant potential for investment loss. Their markets are likely to be volatile and there may be sharp price fluctuations even during periods when prices overall are rising. International investing involves special risks, including currency fluctuations, differing financial accounting standards, and possible political and economic volatility. The Consumer Price Index is a measure of inflation compiled by the US Bureau of Labor Studies. The Leading Economic Index (LEI) provides an early indication of significant turning points in the business cycle and where the economy is heading in the near term. This is not a recommendation to purchase or sell the stocks of the companies pictured/mentioned.  Investing in small-cap stocks generally involves greater risks, and therefore, may not be appropriate for every investor. The prices of small company stocks may be subject to more volatility than those of large company stocks. The Nikkei 225 is a stock market index is for the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE). It is the most widely quoted average of Japanese equities. Sector investments are companies engaged in business related to a specific sector. They are subject to fierce competition and their products and services may be subject to rapid obsolescence. There are additional risks associated with investing in an individual sector, including limited diversification.

Material created by Raymond James for use by its advisors.

Jimmy Carter, RIP

First Trust Monday Morning Outlook

Brian S. Wesbury - Chief Economist

Robert Stein, CFA - Dep. Chief Economist

December 30, 2024

Jimmy Carter, the thirty-ninth president of the United States passed away this weekend, at age 100, the first former president to ever reach that milestone.

The Election of 1976, when Carter won, seems like it happened in a different country. The Democrats swept all the states of the Confederacy with the exception of Virginia. The Republican candidate, Gerald Ford, won a large group of states that included Illinois, Vermont, Connecticut, New Jersey, California, Oregon, and Washington. (Look it up if you don’t believe it!)

Although many political and economic conservatives still associate the Carter presidency with economic mismanagement, high inflation, and recession, his Administration’s policy choices and experience were not unique to his Administration.

Yes, inflation hit double-digits under Carter, but it did so in the Nixon Administration, as well. Yes, Carter tried to fight inflation by imposing credit controls on the banking system, but the Nixon Administration imposed economy-wide wage and price controls to try to address inflation.

Yes, Carter’s first choice to lead the Federal Reserve was G. William Miller, a lawyer with no particular insight into monetary policy or fighting inflation. But, when the going got rough, he replaced Miller with Paul Volker, who brought inflation back under control and was later re-appointed by President Reagan. Nixon’s Fed chief was Arthur Burns, who supported tight money when he was an academic but then bent over backwards to appease Nixon’s desire for loose money when running the Fed.

In the meantime, Carter was willing to take on many special-interest economic sacred cows and deregulate major parts of the US economy. Believe it or not, before Carter, bureaucrats in Washington, DC at the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) would set the ticket price for every seat on every airline that flew. They controlled which airlines flew which routes and only allowed airlines to use amenities, like food or seat-types, to compete. That’s why back then flying was expensive and unusual for the broad middle-class and below.

Carter appointed Alfred Kahn, who despised regulation, as his inflation czar. While most don’t remember, Kahn was a lightning rod, much like Elon Musk is today. He was outspoken and got in trouble for talking about “recession,” so he started to call it a “banana.” The banana industry got upset, so he then called it a “kumquat.” And all this happened before Twitter or X, or any modern social media existed.

Kahn tried to resign, but Carter wouldn’t let him, and appointed him to head the CAB. He is the only agency head in the history of Washington, DC to take over an agency and then dismantle it. The Civil Aeronautics Board is gone, and airline deregulation happened because of Kahn and President Carter.

The Carter Administration also led on deregulating trucking. We understand this is going to sound completely ridiculous, maybe even made-up, but before Carter a truck that left one state with a load and delivered it elsewhere was required to go back empty to the original state before it could make another round trip. (Seriously, we are not making this up!)

In addition, the Carter Administration led the fight to deregulate government rate-setting for trains and remove restrictions on long distance phone service. Older readers will remember their parents telling them to hurry up when talking to friends or relatives long-distance because it cost so much more!

The Carter-era, in general, happened before tribal politics made it impossible for the left to trust free markets. In addition to deregulating so many sectors, Carter supported a cut in the capital gains tax rate, in effect reducing the top tax rate on long-term gains to 28% from a prior 35%. Yes, Reagan then cut it to 20% for several years, but Carter cut it first.

Today the greatest economic challenges are different than in the late 1970s, but in remembrance of President Carter, we suggest politicians in DC think back to that era. Learning from history is important. Deregulating industries helped the American people with lower prices and more choices. Today, the US economy is like Gulliver tied up by a thousand strands of thread by the Lilliputians. Carter was the one who started to cut those threads.

Let’s do it again.

The attached information was developed by First Trust, an independent third party. The opinions are of the listed authors at First Trust Advisors L.P, and are independent from and not necessarily those of RJFS or Raymond James.  All investments are subject to risk. There is no guarantee that these statements, opinions, or forecasts provided in the attached article will prove to be correct. Individual investor's results will vary. Past performance does not guarantee future results. Forward looking data is subject to change at any time and there is no assurance that projections will be realized. Any information provided is for informational purposes only and does not constitute a recommendation. Investing involves risk and you may incur a profit or loss regardless of strategy selected.

We Need Peter Doocy at a Fed Presser

First Trust Monday Morning Outlook

Brian S. Wesbury - Chief Economist

Robert Stein, CFA - Dep. Chief Economist

December 16, 2024

The most fun anyone has had at a Jerome Powell presser was when a reporter asked about President Trump removing Powell from his job. Otherwise, almost all the questions are about when and how much the federal funds rate will be cut.

The reason we bring this up is that there are only certain reporters allowed in the Fed’s press briefing, and, other than hearings on Capitol Hill, it’s the only chance the nation has to ask questions. If a member of the Press Corp asked about New Jersey drones, they might not get invited back. But it seems to us that there are very obvious and important questions that never get asked. Who will be the Peter Doocy of the Fed Press Corp?

So, just in case there is a member of the press who is willing to push the envelope here are a few questions we suggest.

First, about two years ago the Fed drew attention to something called “SuperCore” inflation, which excludes all goods, food, energy, and housing rents. At the time, SuperCore inflation was running less hot than overall inflation. Today, the CPI version of SuperCore is up 4.3% in the past year and is running hotter than it was a year ago. The PCE version is likely to be up at least 3.5% in the year ending in November, well above the Fed’s 2.0% inflation target. And yet the Fed now seems to ignore SuperCore. What changed? Did the Fed have second thoughts about the usefulness of SuperCore? If so, why did the Fed change its mind? Or did the Fed stop talking about it because the message from SuperCore is that inflation is nowhere near stabilized?

Second, the M2 measure of the money supply soared more than 40% in the first two years of COVID, and what followed was the highest inflation in four decades. The M2 money supply then dropped and, initially, inflation dropped fast. Do you think these were just coincidences, or do you think keeping track of the money supply might actually help the Fed predict future inflation trends? Do you know of any other measure that did a better job of predicting the COVID-era inflation trends than M2? If so, why weren’t you using it before the high inflation hit or back when you were claiming inflation was “transitory?”

Third, the Fed has been running operating losses of about $100 billion per year for each of the past two fiscal years. Those operating losses are covered by the Treasury Department out of general revenue. And yet Federal Reserve Banks around the country, and perhaps even at the Board of Governors itself, are still paying for and publishing non-monetary research.

For example, the Chicago Federal Reserve Bank is very concerned about childcare and lead water pipes. There are multiple other government agencies that focus on these issues. Doesn’t the Fed feel a responsibility, at a time when it’s running huge losses, to at least temporarily stop spending taxpayer money on these activities? How much of the research in the past two years is on topics outside the Fed’s jurisdiction, which, under law, is supposed to be monetary policy and bank regulation? What other initiatives outside these key topics are the Fed funding with taxpayer money? Do you think the Fed itself should be the sole arbiter of what kind of research it pays for? Is there any dollar limit the Fed should have on research and other spending?

Unfortunately, we doubt anyone in the press will ask Powell these questions. Maybe the new Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) will ask. Somebody needs to. The Fed’s balance sheet has grown about 7X (700%) since the start of QE in 2008, and it seems that it has done so with very little oversight, from Congress, the White House, or the Press Corp.

The attached information was developed by First Trust, an independent third party. The opinions are of the listed authors at First Trust Advisors L.P, and are independent from and not necessarily those of RJFS or Raymond James.  All investments are subject to risk. There is no guarantee that these statements, opinions, or forecasts provided in the attached article will prove to be correct. Individual investor's results will vary. Past performance does not guarantee future results. Forward looking data is subject to change at any time and there is no assurance that projections will be realized. Any information provided is for informational purposes only and does not constitute a recommendation. Investing involves risk and you may incur a profit or loss regardless of strategy selected.

Abundant Reserves, Abundant Losses: Fed's Q3 Financials

First Trust Three on Thursday

Brian S. Wesbury - Chief Economist

Robert Stein, CFA - Dep. Chief Economist

December 12, 2024

In this week’s edition of “Three on Thursday,” we look at the Federal Reserve’s financials through the third quarter of 2024. Back in 2008, the Federal Reserve (the “Fed”) embarked on a novel experiment in monetary policy by transitioning from a “scarce reserve” system to one characterized by “abundant reserves.” In addition to inflation, this experiment has resulted in some other developments that are worrisome. Higher interest rates have resulted in substantial unrealized losses on the Fed’s securities portfolio. Simultaneously, they have caused the Fed to pay out more in interest to banks than it is earning, resulting in sizable and ongoing operating losses. To offer deeper insights into where things stood through the third quarter of this year, we have included the two charts and table below.

Before 2022, the Fed earned more from its Treasury and mortgage-backed securities (MBS) than it paid banks. At the peak a few months ago, the Fed was paying an annualized 5.40% on reserves. Today, it pays banks 4.65% annually to hold reserves, exceeding its income from these assets, leading to significant quarterly operating losses for eight consecutive quarters. While losses will persist, they should lessen as the Fed continues to cut rates. The Fed plays fast and loose with accounting and labels these losses as a deferred asset on its balance sheet. It appears that the Treasury is lending the Fed money against this deferred asset, plus enough to cover its operating expenses. This is all based on the Fed’s promise to repay the Treasury when it returns to profitability. In Q3 2024, net earnings remittances to the Treasury were -$20.3 billion, with the deferred asset now sitting over $200 billion.

The Fed has over $800 billion in unrealized losses on its balance sheet, but it’s important to note the unique position it’s in. Unlike many financial institutions, the Fed doesn’t face solvency concerns because it’s not required to mark its portfolio to market values. The Fed has the option to hold its securities until they mature, and there’s no regulatory agency that can intervene and force it to shut down due to accounting losses. With total reported capital of just $43.4 billion in Q3 of 2024, the Fed’s unrealized loss of $818.4 billion represents more than 18 times its capital.

The real beneficiaries in recent years have been banks and financial institutions, which earned $57.2 billion in Q3 alone from just holding reserves and reverse repurchase agreements. As the Fed continues to cut rates and shrink its balance sheet, interest payments to these institutions will decline. However, costs are still projected to remain high, we estimate at over $200 billion for 2024. These expenses are ultimately borne by taxpayers.

There is no guarantee that past trends will continue, or projections will be realized. This report was prepared by First Trust Advisors L.P., and reflects the current opinion of the authors. It is based upon sources and data believed to be accurate and reliable. Opinions and forward looking statements expressed are subject to change without notice. This information does not constitute a solicitation or an offer to buy or sell any security.

The attached information was developed by First Trust, an independent third party. The opinions are of the listed authors at First Trust Advisors L.P, and are independent from and not necessarily those of RJFS or Raymond James.  All investments are subject to risk. There is no guarantee that these statements, opinions, or forecasts provided in the attached article will prove to be correct. Individual investor's results will vary. Past performance does not guarantee future results. Forward looking data is subject to change at any time and there is no assurance that projections will be realized. Any information provided is for informational purposes only and does not constitute a recommendation. Investing involves risk and you may incur a profit or loss regardless of strategy selected.

Irresponsible and Addictive Deficits

First Trust Monday Morning Outlook

Brian S. Wesbury - Chief Economist

Robert Stein, CFA - Dep. Chief Economist

December 9, 2024

Why hasn’t tighter monetary policy caused a recession? One reason: federal budget deficits have been huge. Don’t get us wrong, we don’t believe government spending is good for the economy in the long-run. But, in the short-run, it certainly can make things look and feel, better. Just ask Amazon, which basically doubled its workforce during COVID as people spent their pandemic payments buying stuff, instead of paying off student loans.

The budget deficit soared to 14.7% of GDP in Fiscal Year 2020 and was followed in 2021 by a deficit of 12.1% of GDP. They were the two largest deficits as a share of the economy since World War II, larger than in the 1981-82 recession and the Great Recession and Financial Panic of 2008-09.

Meanwhile, the M2 measure of the money supply soared. M2 rose a massive 41% in the twenty-five months during COVID. As a result, CPI inflation took off – peaking at 9 %.

However, after peaking in March 2022, M2 declined 5% by October 2023 and has since grown only 3% in the past year. Normally that kind of slowdown in M2 would be followed by a recession, but the economy grew a hardy 3.2% in 2023 (Q4/Q4) and appears headed for growth of about 2.6% in 2024, which is above the 2.1% trend of the past twenty years.

We think one of the reasons for continued growth in the face of tighter monetary policy is that the federal budget blowout never really stopped.

The federal budget deficit was 6.2% of GDP in FY 2023 and 6.4% in FY 2024, which ended on September 30. Let’s put these in historical perspective. During the 1980s, President Reagan was consistently criticized for running overly large budget deficits. He was criticized by the Democrats, the opposition party at the time; he was criticized by the media (Sam Donaldson comes to mind); he was even criticized by many of his fellow Republicans. And yet the largest deficit ever run under Reagan was 5.9% of GDP in FY 1983.

But Reagan had two pretty good excuses for that deficit. First, he was fully funding the Pentagon at the height of the Cold War. Second, and more important, the unemployment rate that year was 10%, meaning spending on unemployment and welfare were elevated.

There are no similar excuses for the past two years. In the past two fiscal years the unemployment rate averaged less than 4% and we aren’t at war. We get that Keynesians want stimulative budget deficits when the unemployment rate is high; but no serious Keynesian, much less a supply-sider, can intellectually support current deficits.

We think the enormity of these deficits, relative to economic conditions, have temporarily masked or hidden some of the pain we will eventually feel from the tightening of monetary policy in the past couple of years. In turn, this means the US is not yet out of the woods on recession risk in spite of the great optimism now embedded in US equity prices.

Also notice how little extra bang for the buck the US is getting out of these deficits. Keynesian theory suggests extra government spending should generate multipliers that can make growth soar. Yes, the economy is still OK so far, but soaring it is not.

The big question for the next few years is how quickly the federal government can wean itself from an addiction to big budget deficits and whether it can successfully implement progrowth policies at the same time. In other words, will the loss of deficit stimulus (if DOGE is successful at cutting spending) be offset by a productivity boost from less regulation and more certainty on tax rates in the future?

If government spending really is cut, and the government becomes a smaller burden on the private sector, that will boost growth – in the long-run. However, roughly 50% of new jobs in the past year were in government and healthcare (which is dominated by government). That boost to growth will recede when spending is cut in the short-term.

If the Fed tries to offset the short-term hit to growth with easier money, then inflation could easily flare up again. Quitting any addiction is painful in the short-term, but positive in the longterm. The next few years will be interesting for sure.

The attached information was developed by First Trust, an independent third party. The opinions are of the listed authors at First Trust Advisors L.P, and are independent from and not necessarily those of RJFS or Raymond James.  All investments are subject to risk. There is no guarantee that these statements, opinions, or forecasts provided in the attached article will prove to be correct. Individual investor's results will vary. Past performance does not guarantee future results. Forward looking data is subject to change at any time and there is no assurance that projections will be realized. Any information provided is for informational purposes only and does not constitute a recommendation. Investing involves risk and you may incur a profit or loss regardless of strategy selected.

Inflation Distractions

First Trust Monday Morning Outlook

Brian S. Wesbury - Chief Economist

Robert Stein, CFA - Dep. Chief Economist

December 2, 2024

It’s hard to keep track of all the theories about inflation. Remember policymakers and analysts blaming the surge in inflation in 2021-22 on supply-chain disruptions, too much government spending, and Putin invading Ukraine? Now some are saying that tariffs and deportations are going to cause a second surge in inflation.

The problem with all these theories is that they ignore the ultimate cause of inflation, which is too much money chasing too few goods. Why did inflation surge in 2020-21? Because in the 25 months ending in March 2022 the M2 measure of the money supply rose an unprecedented 40.6%. That’s why!

We’re not saying supply-chain disruptions were meaningless. If businesses couldn’t get a hold of the inputs they needed to make a product then of course the price for that particular item went up. But if consumers had to pay more for that item then that meant less money left over to buy other items – and roughly zero net change to inflation – unless the Federal Reserve changed the growth rate of the money supply, which is exactly what happened.

The same goes for the link between more government spending and inflation. Yes, without that spending some of the extra inflation might not have happened, but the spending itself wasn’t the key behind higher inflation: the key factor was that the Fed accommodated politicians’ desire for more spending by letting the money supply rip.

But now there are new theories to contend with, like the oncoming Trump tariffs or deportations of illegal immigrants causing a resurgence in inflation. There is plenty of room to argue about the merits of these policies on other grounds, but general price inflation is not one of them. President Trump raised tariffs and reduced immigration back in his first term, and CPI inflation averaged 1.9% annualized.

Yes, tariffs on certain goods will put upward pressure on prices for those particular goods. But unless the Fed starts increasing the money supply faster, that will mean countervailing downward pressure on prices for other goods and services.

The argument that low immigration (or even negative immigration) would boost inflation is even worse. Advocates of high immigration have always argued that newcomers don’t take jobs away from natives or reduce their wages because immigrants bring not only labor supply but also labor demand. Fair enough. But if that’s true, shouldn’t deportations reduce not only supply but demand, as well?

Immigration has surged since early 2021 and yet inflation has averaged 5.0% per year, the most in decades. If we can have high immigration and high inflation, we think the Fed can get to low inflation with low immigration, as well.

None of this is to argue that inflation hasn’t been a problem or won’t continue to be a problem in the years ahead. We think the bipartisan low inflation consensus that prevailed prior to the Great Recession and Financial Crisis of 2008-09 is dead and expect inflation will average 2.5% or more in the decade to come. But that’s because we think the Fed will conduct a looser monetary policy, not because of tariffs, government spending, deportations, supply-chains, or Putin.

The attached information was developed by First Trust, an independent third party. The opinions are of the listed authors at First Trust Advisors L.P, and are independent from and not necessarily those of RJFS or Raymond James.  All investments are subject to risk. There is no guarantee that these statements, opinions, or forecasts provided in the attached article will prove to be correct. Individual investor's results will vary. Past performance does not guarantee future results. Forward looking data is subject to change at any time and there is no assurance that projections will be realized. Any information provided is for informational purposes only and does not constitute a recommendation. Investing involves risk and you may incur a profit or loss regardless of strategy selected.

Budget Rule Shenanigans

First Trust Monday Morning Outlook

Brian S. Wesbury - Chief Economist

Robert Stein, CFA - Dep. Chief Economist

November 25, 2024

The Tax Cut and Jobs Act (TCJA) was passed in 2017, otherwise known as the Trump Tax Cuts. Because of arcane budget rules, the TCJA will “sunset” or expire at the end of 2025 in the absence of a brand-new tax law. The potentially expiring tax cuts include those on regular income as well as estates and qualified small businesses.

In turn, a key legislative problem throughout the process will be biased budget rules. You’d think that just keeping the tax code the same as it was this past year wouldn’t take any special political effort at all, but that’s not how it works.

Tax legislation must be “scored” by the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), in order to estimate the impact on revenues in future years. If the JCT and CBO compare current tax rates to the rates that existed before the TCJA, they call it a tax cut all over again. This scores as a cut in revenue (therefore a boost in the deficit from its current path), and 60 votes in the US Senate are necessary to make the new law permanent.

The other option is to find “pay fors” – offsetting tax hikes or spending cuts – that would “pay” for the tax cuts. If there aren’t 60 Senate votes or enough “offsets,” a tax cut can be made “temporary” as long as it fits inside other arcane rules. This is what happened in 2017. It’s why the TJCA expires in 2025.

So, the same issue will come up next year when the Trump Administration tries to extend the current tax rates. Senate rules say that if tax rates stay at the exact same level they are today, this will “cost” approximately $4 trillion in revenue over the next 10 years. Therefore, the Senate needs 60 votes to do this.

The problem is that the CBO and JCT were totally off on their forecasts of tax revenue back in 2018 when they scored the TCJA. In April 2018, the CBO said revenues would be $4.4 trillion in 2024. The were actually $4.9 trillion. Inflation, you say? OK…the CBO estimated that tax revenues would average 17% of GDP between 2021 and 2024, but they actually averaged 17.7% of GDP. To put this in further perspective, from 1974- 2023, the average federal tax share of GDP has been 17.3%.

In other words, the tax cuts did not lose anywhere near the revenue the CBO projected. Prior to the TCJA, the CBO said revenues would rise to 18.1% of GDP between 2021 and 2024. They estimated the TCJA would drop that to 17% of GDP, when in reality it averaged 17.7%. Why? Because government scores tax rate changes “statically.” But we all know the world is not static. Behavior changes when people face different incentives, and tax rates are a big one.

The biggest problem today is not tax revenues…it is spending. Back in 2018, the CBO forecasted that total public debt would be $22.9 trillion at the end of FY 2024. The actual figure was $28.3 trillion. Congress never has a problem spending more, and the rules are biased against tax cuts.

It is true that tax rates are “scheduled” to rise in 2026 and the CBO estimates this will raise revenue. But the CBO underestimated revenue after the TCJA. So, if Congress cannot find a way to say “extending current tax rates costs nothing,” the least it can do is admit that it underestimated the loss in revenue by 0.7% of GDP (17% vs 17.7%). That would mitigate more than 60% of the costs of extending the TCJA. Revenues did not fall from 18.1% of GDP to 17%...they were actually 17.7%.

Without moving to dynamic scoring, the government must pay for tax cuts with spending cuts or other tax hikes. In the past, Congress has scored potential savings from new rules in its budget, so why not score DOGE (the Musk-Ramaswamy enterprise) as cutting spending, even if it will come at some later date? Who actually thinks they won’t be somewhat successful?

The most frustrating part of all this is that if a new Administration and Congressional majorities wanted to raise taxes rather than reduce taxes the same burdensome legislative hurdles would not apply. A bill to raise taxes would be assessed using static scoring – no slower economic growth – and would show revenue going up, and then be allowed as a permanent change to the tax code, with no need for periodic temporary extension bills like tax cutters will have to pass next year. That is totally unfair!

The attached information was developed by First Trust, an independent third party. The opinions are of the listed authors at First Trust Advisors L.P, and are independent from and not necessarily those of RJFS or Raymond James.  All investments are subject to risk. There is no guarantee that these statements, opinions, or forecasts provided in the attached article will prove to be correct. Individual investor's results will vary. Past performance does not guarantee future results. Forward looking data is subject to change at any time and there is no assurance that projections will be realized. Any information provided is for informational purposes only and does not constitute a recommendation. Investing involves risk and you may incur a profit or loss regardless of strategy selected.

Don’t Forget the Lags

First Trust Monday Morning Outlook

Brian S. Wesbury - Chief Economist

Robert Stein, CFA - Dep. Chief Economist

November 18, 2024

In our lifetimes, the best comparison for Trump’s election win is Ronald Reagan’s in 1980. That election, like this one, pitted big spenders and champions of government against tax cutters and critics of government.

It is pretty clear that markets approved of both winning campaigns as they were happening. Leading up to the election in 1980, like this year, the S&P 500 rallied as it became clearer that Reagan (like Trump) was likely to win. The market also rallied in the days following the election because markets like tax cuts, deregulation, and restrained government. And, at the same time, the policies the markets didn’t like – such as a tax on unrealized capital gains – were now dead.

But after being euphoric at the outcome of the election in 1980, reality set in. Paul Volcker was fighting inflation with tight money, a recession was inevitable and tax cuts took time to pass. The S&P 500 fell in 1981 and in the first eight months of 1982 before the Reagan bull market really started.

History doesn’t repeat itself, but at times it rhymes. And while there are similarities between today and 1981, there are also some key differences. For example, the Federal Reserve is now cutting interest rates, not raising them. However, there are some big differences that investors need to pay attention to. First, in October 1980, the Price-Earnings ratio of the S&P 500 was 8.6. In October 2024, the PE ratio was 27. In other words, while the market may appreciate better policies, it sure looks like they are already priced in.

Moreover, while Trump is selecting his cabinet rapidly and his team has likely already done the homework needed to move fast on executive orders that can boost growth, much of the real work will take time. It appears Congress wants to move fast, but it is still Congress and that means it’s messy.

Reagan cut tax rates across the board, Trump plans to maintain most current tax rates with some small changes, and promised to eliminate taxes on tips, social security, and overtime. These tax cuts are welcome, but they are not true supply-side tax cuts…the ones that boost entrepreneurship and innovation.

The really powerful potential of the Trump plans will come from DOGE, the Department of Government Efficiency, where Musk and Ramaswamy plan on proposing big cuts to the fourth branch of government – the Bureaucrats. Every regulation that they can cut, every bureaucrat that they can keep from gumming up the private sector, will boost productivity.

But in addition to cutting red tape, the US must cut the absolute size of government. John Maynard Keynes wanted deficit spending ended after a crisis was over. But, after both the Panic of 2008 and COVID, the US kept spending elevated. Government spending has risen from 19.1% of GDP in 2007 to 23.4% this year. Government is a ball and chain on the economy. We estimate that every one percentage point increase of spending as a share of GDP reduces underlying real GDP growth by 0.2%.

Every dollar the government spends is taken from the private sector, and the government taxes and borrows nearly 5% more of GDP today than it did seventeen years ago. From 1990 through 2007, real GDP grew 3% per year. From 2008 through the second quarter of 2024, real GDP has only grown 2% per year. No wonder “the economy” was the #1 factor for Americans in this election. Two percent annual growth is stagnation.

And this shouldn’t be happening according to fans of big government. Economists like Mark Zandi and Paul Krugman support government spending and argue that it has a positive multiplier ($1 of government spending creates more than $1 of GDP). Add this to the fact that the US has invented unbelievably productive new technologies in the last 17 years, and the economy should be booming. Especially with the Fed holding rates at zero for nine of those years.

But it hasn’t, and the reason is that government is just too darn big. Cutting government spending is a double-edged sword. Half of all job growth in the past year has been in government jobs directly, as well as healthcare which is dominated by government. Taking away that spending will initially slow job growth, but, with a lag, eventually boost economic activity.

In other words, the Trump Administration has a chance to boost underlying economic growth rates, and that would be extremely positive for living standards and equity values over the long-term. But initially, it may result in slower growth. The US had a car wreck with COVID. Easy money from the Fed and big deficits were like morphine. The US is addicted to short-term fixes that do nothing to boost long-term growth. Withdrawal from the pain killers hurts, but is necessary to get truly healthy.

While we are extremely positive about the long-term benefits of policy changes, like under Reagan, weaning the US from massively easy fiscal policies does not guarantee overnight success. It will take time, and the US will come through to the other side stronger. The entire world will benefit…with a lag.

The attached information was developed by First Trust, an independent third party. The opinions are of the listed authors at First Trust Advisors L.P, and are independent from and not necessarily those of RJFS or Raymond James.  All investments are subject to risk. There is no guarantee that these statements, opinions, or forecasts provided in the attached article will prove to be correct. Individual investor's results will vary. Past performance does not guarantee future results. Forward looking data is subject to change at any time and there is no assurance that projections will be realized. Any information provided is for informational purposes only and does not constitute a recommendation. Investing involves risk and you may incur a profit or loss regardless of strategy selected.